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ABSTRACT
1 INTRODUCTION
In the 1970’s, Zeigler introduce the DEVS formalism (Zei-
gler, Kim, and Praehofer 2000): a hierarchical component
approach to separate modelling concerns. In DEV/SES,
Zeigler introduce the notion of Experimental Framework
(Zeigler, Kim, and Praehofer 2000). This Experimental
Framework divides the computer simulation in two parts:
on one hand the model of the System Under Testing (SUT)
and on the other hand, the Experimental Frame. Here-
after, we will refer to the part of the Experimental Frame
that generates exogenous events for the model part, as the
scenario part. This approach has benefits and drawbacks.
The benefits are a better separation of concerns that favors
reusability of components. The drawbacks are twofold: (i)
it prohibits direct interactions between the scenario part and
components deeply burried in the model part; (ii) it does
not support building scenario based on structural changes
of the model.
In this paper, we introduce new techniques to get around
these limitations while enforcing the separation of concerns
approach of the Experimental Framework. In fact, separat-
ing models and scenario allow a better reuse of components
in both parts: reuse a model with a lot of Experimental
Frame, or reuse an Experimental Frame with a lot of model
depending on the goals of the simulation. In particular, a
model that can be reused multiple times or used in combi-
nation with other models can save a many time, money, and
human effort (Davis and Anderson 2003). From a method-
ological point of view, reuse allows to: (i) build reference
model used in several studies, particularly to compare dif-
ferent solutions and (ii) benefit from user feed-back and/or
improvements. There are also situations in wich reuse can
simply not be avoided. Indeed, we may distinguish two
levels of component reuse: (i) reuse at source level offers
enough flexibility to allow reusing with modifications of the
sources. But this modifications can cost a lot of time and
money in terms of verification and validation. (ii) Reuse
at execution level prohibits modifications because sources
code are not provided. The sources code was not provided
when the model must remain secret: to protect an industrial
secret, for security reasons, and so on.
Section 2 present the software background involved in
this paper. Section 3 present the use case in wich we present
the use of ADL (section 3.2) and AOP (section 3.3).
2 Background
This section present Open Simulation Architecture (OSA)
(Dalle 2007): a discrete-event simulator that provides a
process-oriented programming model and the software in-
volved in this implementation.
2.1 Open Simulation Architecture
The goal of OSA is to help users in their simulation activities
like building models, developping simulations campaigns,
running experiences plans, or analyzing data results. Also,
OSA aims at becoming framework for the modelling and
simulation community by favoring the integration of new
or existing contributions at all levels architecture. Figure
1 represents the OSA architecture. In the left part, the
front end-users GUI based on Eclipse framework. In the
center part, the functional concerns and in the right part
the simulation tasks. Functional concerns resolve one or
more typical simulation tasks. Each functional concerns
are part of the OSA software components and must be
considered optional and replaceable independently from one
another. In OSA, handling are almost always hidden in the
controller component thus significantly reduce themodelling
process, but also simplifies the replacement of any part of the
simulation engine. OSA allows to model component-based
systems using Fractal component (Bruneton, Coupaye, and
Stefani 2004). AOKell, an open implementation in Java of
the Fractal component model, provides an aspect-oriented
approach to integrate control concerns in component. In
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practice, the real system is represented by a FractalADL
application. This application can then be instrumented using
Fractal component capability.
Figure 1: OSA functionnal architecture.
2.2 Fractal component
Fractal basis development lies in writing components and
connections that enable components communication. Frac-
tal specification is based on: (1) hierarchical components
that provide a uniform view of applications at different levels
of abstraction, (2) shared components that allow modelling
and sharing of resources, while preserving hierarchical com-
ponents, (3) introspection to observe the performance of a
system, and (4) (re)configuration capabilities that enable
deployment and dynamic system configuration. Further-
more, Fractal is an extensible model because it allows the
developer to customize the control capabilities of each ap-
plication’s component. A Fractal component is an unit of
deployment that have one or more interfaces. An interface
is an entry point to the component. An interface implements
an interface type, which specifies the operations supported
by the interface. There are two types of interfaces: server
interfaces that correspond to the services provided by the
component and client interfaces that correspond to services
required by the component. A Fractal component is nor-
mally composed of two parts: a membrane which possesses
functional interfaces and interfaces allowing introspection
and (dynamic) configuration of a component, and a content
that is made up of a finite set of sub-components.
Figure 3 shows an example of Fractal component. Com-
ponents are represented by rectangles. The bold line cor-
responds to the membrane component. The inner part
corresponds to the content of the component. Interfaces are
represented by round for clients interfaces, and by empty
half-round for servers interfaces. Note that internal inter-
faces allow a hierarchic component to control the exposure
of its external interfaces to its sub-components. External
sub−component
content
binding
external
interface component
shared
membrane
Figure 2: Fractal component example.
interfaces appearing at the top of the components are com-
ponent control interfaces. dashed line represent connections
among components. Fractal provide a Architecture Descrip-
tion Language (ADL) (Clements 1996), (Medvidovic and
Taylor 2000) to describe applications architecture.
2.2.1 Fractal ADL
FractalADL is a XML language to describe the architecture
of a Fractal application: components topology (or hierarchy),
relationship between client and server, name and initial
value of components attributes. A FractalADL definition
can be divided into several subs definitions and several
files. Moreover, the language supports a mechanism to
ease the extension and redefinition through inheritance. The
motivation for such scalability is twofold. On the other hand,
the component model itself is extensible, it is possible to
attach an arbitrary number of components controllers. There
are multiple uses for a given ADL definition: deployment,
verification, analysis, and so on. FractalADL allows to
separate concerns because model definition can be split in
multiple files. ADL language is interpreted by a specialized
component of Fractal called a Factory: to read completely
(recursively) a description of a Fractal application, just send
a request to the Fractal Factory to read and instantiate the
root component of the application. To instantiate the various
components, the factory creates a Fractal Abstract Syntax
Tree (AST), where each node corresponds to a XML entity
of the ADL.
2.3 Aspect-Oriented Programming
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) (Elrad, Filman, and
Bader 2001) is a new paradigm for modularizing applica-
tions with many concerns. AOP goals are (i) separation of
concerns: the goal is to design systems so that functions
can work independently of other functions, and so it is
easier to understand, design and manage complex interde-
pendent systems; (2) crosscutting interactions: it is not easy
to modularized common-interest concerns used by several
modules, like logging service; (3) dependencies inversion:
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instead module use well-known services, the well-know
service shall use modules.
3 Reuse component-based model
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Figure 3: Reuse and adapt a model of reference.
We present in this paper new techniques to build scenar-
ios from existing component models. We focus on reusing
model at execution level. Starting from an existing model
we want to preserve (for example because it came after
a long validation and verification process, or because we
want to keep the source code secret), we build a complex
scenario. Figure 3 show the composition of the complex
scenario and the reference model. Reference model con-
tains two components A and B. Complex scenario add a
new component C between A and B, and a new component
EE wich generate exogeneous events. The composition is
the result of the model and the scenario. To obtain this
composition, we propose to use in two originals ways: (i) an
Architecture Description Language (ADL) with overloading
capability like FractalADL and (ii) Aspect-Oriented Pro-
gramming (AOP) like AspectJ to extend the reusability of
a model thru a simple case study : user authentication on
server thru a not secure file transert protocol (FTP).
ClientImpl ServerImpl
Client Server
cftp
sftp
Figure 4: Components layout of File Transfers Protocol case
study.
3.1 Case study
As described previously, we propose to use AOP and ADL
in an original way to override difficulties in reusing models.
We choose in this paper to show the cost and benefits thru a
simple case study. First, let us assume that we have a model
we want to reuse to test different security flaws. There is
a model representing the Basic operation of a server File
Transfer Protocol (FTP). This simple model has not been
developed in order to be used in this study, we are not
supppose to have the source code, and even we need to test
the safety of this protocol. Figure 4 shows the architecture
of the model, and Listing 1 details its implementation in
FractalADL. Line 4 specifies the name of this model, line
6-11 correspond to the client definition and line 12-19 to
the server definition. Line 7-9 and 14-16 describe client
and server interfaces used by the binding on line 20-21.
Listing 1 Fractal ADL definition used to implement layout
of figure 4.
01<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?>
02<!DOCTYPE definition skipped ... >
03
04<definition name="ftp">
05
06 <component name="Client">
07 <interface name="cftp"
08 role="client"
09 signature="FTPService"/>
10 <content class="ClientImpl"/>
11 </component>
12
12 <component name="Server">
14 <interface name="sftp"
15 role="server"
16 signature="FTPService"/>
17 <content class="ServerImpl"/>
18 </component>
19
20 <binding client="Client.cftp"
21 server="Server.sftp"/>
22</definition>
The protocol represented by this model is a two-party
protocol. We will denote the two parties by the name Client
and Server (Client want to be authenticated on Server). The
model works like this : the client send the users login and
password to the server to be authenticated. To do this,
client ask his interface (cftp, declared line 07) to obtain
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connection with the server. In this study, we focus on the
login process to test security flaw.
From this model, we propose a new reusing approach.
First, we will show how to add a man in the middle attacker
in this model using the overload capability of FractalADL.
Second, we will show how to simulate spyware on client
using the overload capability of FractalADL and AOP.
3.2 Man-in-the-middle attacker with Fractal ADL
ClientImpl ServerImpl
Client Server
cftp
sftp
AttackerImpl
asftp acftp
Attacker
Figure 5: Components layout of Fractal’s MITM attack.
From the original model describe in section 3.1, we
want to test the ftp login process security. We decide to test
the security against a man-in-the-middle attacker. In the
man-in-the-middle setting (MITM), there is a third party
calledAdversary. All the communication betweenClient and
Server are intercepted by Adversary. Thus both Client and
Server talk to Adversary and cannot communicate directly
with each other. Adversary need to transmit information
between Client and Server, but - it’s the security break -
he can read, change, or drop transmit depending on his
settings.
Whatmakes this case interesting is tomodify the original
FTP topology (figure 4) to obtain the new topology describe
in figure 5. In practice, we need to add a new component
inside a model. Like in reality, Adversary need to mimic
Server interface and Client Interface. In fact, Adversary
need to imitates Server for the Client, and imitates Client
for the Server. Figure 5 show the new architecture we
want to obtain compared to figure 4 section ??. Since
model is locked, we cannot change his topology directly in
source code. Listing 2 shows how to use the FractalADL
overload capability to overload the topology. Line 04 show
we extend the original ftp model in a new model called
mitm-ftp. Line 06-14 represent the declaration of the new
Adversary component. And line 16-19 demonstrate how
overload the original binding between Client and Server by
a new binding between Client and Adversary, and between
Listing 2 Fractal ADL definition used to implement layout
of figure 5.
01<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?>
02<!DOCTYPE definition skipped ... >
03
04<definition name="mitm-ftp" extends="ftp">
05
06 <component name="Adversary">
07 <interface name="acftp"
08 role="client"
09 signature="FTPService"/>
10 <interface name="asftp"
11 role="server"
12 signature="FTPService"/>
13 <content class="AdversaryImpl"/>
14 </component>
15
16 <binding client="Client.cftp"
17 server="Adversary.asftp"/>
18 <binding client="Adversary.acftp"
19 server="Server.sftp"/>
20</definition>
Adversary and Server. With this topology, communication
between the Client and the Server pass thru the Adversary.
This example shows how to modify a model to include
new component or change topology. The overload capa-
bility of Fractal ADL permit to reuse and change some
specification of the model like topology. In fact, in our
example, communication between the Client and the Server
go thru the Adversary but the FTP model have not been
modified. We build a new model extending the original
FTP model, and overload the binding between the Client
and the Server. In the next section, we use FractalADL to
add a new component and change the topology, but we also
demonstrate how to use AOP. The next section described
the FTP model with a spyware inside the client.
3.3 Spyware with aspect-oriented programming
In this section, we demonstrate how using Fractal ADL
and aspect-oriented programming we can add a spyware
(Stafford and Urbaczewski 2004) into the Client from the
original FTP model. Spyware is the name given to the class
of software that is surreptitiously installed on a computer
and monitors users activities and reports back to a third
party on that behavior [Anon, 2004; Daniels, 2004; Doyle,
2003; Taylor, 2002]. We want to model a spyware inside
the Client of the FTP model. The goal of this attack is to
take the user login and password when typed in. Spyware
send all information to a third party using the network. The
model architecture we want to obtain is shown in figure 6.
We see the Client is connected to a third entity (Spy) and
contain a SpyWare inside his implementation.
Listing 3 shows a solution using Fractal ADL and AOP
to introduce spyware in original FTP model. Using the
extension capability of Fractal ADL, we add a new spy
interface to the Client component, we add a Spy component
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Figure 6: FTP model with SpyWare in Client.
and we bind the Client and the Spy together. Line 04
show how to create a new model extending the original
FTP model. Line 06-17 represent the Spy component, line
07-09 represent the interface for connecting with the Spy
component. Line 13-17 represent the Client component
declared in the original FTP model, line 14-16 show the
new interface added to the Client component. Line 19-20
represent the binding to connect the Client with the Spy
component.
Listing 3 Fractal ADL used to implement layout of figure
6.
01<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?>
02<!DOCTYPE definition skipped ... >
03
04<definition name="spyware-ftp" extends="ftp">
05
06 <component name="Spy">
07 <interface name="sspy"
08 role="server"
09 signature="SpyService"/>
10 <content class="SpyImpl"/>
11 </component>
12
13 <component name="Client">
14 <interface name="cspy"
15 role="client"
16 signature="SpyService"/>
17 </component>
18
19 <binding client="Client.cspy"
20 server="Spy.sspy"/>
21</definition>
AOP allows us to introduce new code into objects
without the objects is needing to have any knowledge of
that introduction. The FTP model has been validated and
we don’t have the source code so we can’t change it to
introduce some concerns about spyware. The Listing 4
show how using AOP we can add some concerns inside a
model. Line 01 explain we want to intercept a method call,
and do something before the method was called. Line 02
show the method we want to intercept, it’s all methods from
Listing 4 Fractal ADL used to implement layout of figure
6.
01 before(ClientImpl b) :
02 call(* FTPService.*(..)) && this(b)
03 && if(isBinding(b)) {
04 try {
05 SpyService spyS = b.lookupFc("cspy");
06 spyS.send(thisJoinPoint.getArgs()[0]+"");
07 } catch (NoSuchInterfaceException nsie) {
08 ...
09 }
10 }
the FTPService java interface called by a ClientImpl class.
Line 03 add a condition, only component binded with a Spy
component are concerned. Line 05 ask the Client interface
connected to the Spy component to have this one. Line
06 call thru the connection with the Spy the send method
to send data. This aspect (written in AspectJ) represent
the Spyware, the Spy component represent the third party
waiting for data to analyze.
This example shows how to modify a model to include
new component, change topology and instrument a com-
ponent. The capability of AOP to inject some code inside
the model allow to read variables of the model. Here we
demonstrate how a third component can access the login
and password field during the login process of the client
on server.
4 CONCLUSION
We have shown how ADL and AOP techniques can be used
to extend the reusability of a model. Both techniques offer
new way to create a complex scenario without modifying
the original model. So, the model remain valid and thus
economize a lot of works and moneys. ADL allow to build
a composition of the model and the scenario by overloading
somemodel definition like bindings. AOP helps to add some
code into the model to allow other component reads model’s
variables. But we need to build a tools that automaticaly
verify if the code injected does not modify the model’s
content. In fact, if the code injected have some edge effect,
it would be preferable to replace it by a new component or
concider it as a new component. Future works could be to
study the possibility to build a DEVS engine for OSA. This
means that OSA could offer the DEVS formalism with the
capability to build complexes scenarios by reusing models.
But we need to answers some questions first like is DEVS
formalism compliant with AOP ? Another interesting works
could be to build bigger models and complexes scenarios,
particularly in the security domain.
Ribault and Dalle
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